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Case No. 20060954-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Andrew Brink, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court act within its discretion in excluding expert testimony on 
the deficiencies of eyewitness identification, where the court invited counsel to 
submit jury instructions tailored to the proposed expert testimony? 
Standard of Review. "Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of 
eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Butterfield, 2001UT 59, 1 43,27 P.3d 1133; accord State v. Hollen, 
2002 UT 35, J 66,44 P.3d 794 (holding that '"[t]he trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony7" on eyewitness identification) 
(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). Under this standard, the 
appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony absent an abuse of discretion, that is, "'unless the decision exceeds the 
limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, with a 
sentencing enhancement for using a dangerous weapon. R. 1-3. After being bound 
over for trial following a preliminary hearing, defendant filed a notice that he would 
call as an expert witness Dr. David Dodd, Associate Professor of Psychology at the 
University of Utah. R. 30-31,42. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. 
Dodd's proposed testimony on eyewitness identification. R. 73-84. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion and excluded the 
testimony, but invited counsel to submit modified Long instructions "in light of the 
evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification." R. 289-90. Following a 
two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 324-25. Defendant moved 
to arrest judgment, but that motion was denied. R. 366-67; see R. 377-78. Defendant 
was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six years to life. R. 377-78. He 
timely appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
pursuant to rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 379-80, 388-89. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Robbery 
On the evening of October 5,2005, Alicia Warnock went to the Breathe Day 
Spa for her once-a-month "facial." R. 395:13-14. Therapist Amber Devoge finished 
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Warnock's facial at approximately 8:00 p.m. and the two women walked to the front 
of the spa to look at some facial products. R. 395: 16, 66; R. 396: 121-22. While 
discussing some of the products, Warnock's attention was drawn to two men 
standing just outside the glass double doors to the spa. R. 395:17. The men, who 
were "at most" four or five feet away from Warnock, "caught [her] eye" because 
they did not appear to be "your typical spa client." R. 395:17-18. One wore a navy 
blue sweatshirt with a navy blue bandana or beany on his head ("Blue") and the 
other wore a white or gray sweatshirt with a white bandana on his head ("White"). 
R. 395:18,77) R. 396:118. Warnock also noticed the men because "[t]hey just looked 
really anxious" and "looked like they weren't sure what they were doing." R. 395: 
18. They "looked like they were scoping out the place." R. 395:17. 
After looking at the two men "for a minute," Warnock surmised that they 
may be boyfriends of spa employees and turned her attention back to Devoge. R. 
395:18. But Warnock had a "weird feeling" about the men and again looked back at 
them. R. 395:18. As she did, they opened the door and walked into the spa with 
handguns drawn. R. 395:18-19. With one arm covering his nose and mouth, White 
walked to the front counter. R. 395: 19-21, 62. Blue told Warnock and Devoge to 
step aside and directed them to a waiting area near the front counter. R. 395:19-21, 
30, 88; R. 396:122. With his handgun drawn, he ordered the women to sit on the 
sofa, "making sure that [they] stood still." R. 395: 20,29-31; R. 396:126. Although 
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Blue repeatedly told the women to look down, Warnock did not comply because, as 
a bank employee, she knew to "look for clues like that with robbers." R. 395: 21. 
Meanwhile, with his gun still drawn and an arm partially covering his face, 
White ordered Octavia Martucci and Sunni Jackson, who were working behind the 
front counter, to give him "all the money." R. 395:64; R. 396:120-21. When the two 
women did not immediately respond to White's demand, he again demanded that 
they give him the money and cocked his gun or disengaged the safety. See R. 395: 
84, 91; R. 396: 121. Martucci opened the cash register, removed the cash, and 
handed it to White. R. 395: 66-68,78,84. White moved his arm away from his face, 
reached out, and took the money from Martucci. R. 395: 24, 68, 84.l White then 
directed Martucci and Jackson to the waiting room where Warnock and Devoge 
were sitting and ordered the women to lie down on the ground. R. 395:70. The two 
men then fled the spa. R. 395: 24, 70, 85. After waiting several seconds, the four 
women arose, locked the spa, and called police. R. 395: 24. 
1
 In her witness statement to police, Martucci wrote that she gave the money 
to Blue, but at trial, she testified that she gave the money to White. R. 395:66-68,78-
80,84; DE2a. She explained that she made the mistake because at the time, she was 
upset and "frazzled." R. 395:90,92. Warnock confirmed Martucci's trial testimony 
that White took the money. R. 395:24. Initially, Jackson testified that Blue took the 
money, but later, she testified that she "really can't remember" who took the money. 
R. 396:123,126. She confirmed, however, that White "was the one that was closest 
to [her] and asked [her] for the money." R. 396:126. 
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The Investigation 
The following day, sheriffs deputies arrested Timothy Dorrell for the 
robbery. R. 395:102. After his arrest, Dorrell identified "Andy" as his accomplice 
and told police that Andy lived in an apartment building (about a half block from 
the police station) in a bottom floor apartment across from the laundry room. R. 
395: 102. 2 The next day, Officer Brad Burningham of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department identified the apartment address, traced the apartment to Angela 
Newton, and confirmed that Andrew Brink, the defendant here, lived with her at 
the apartment. R. 395: 34-36,41-42. 
After verifying the residence information, Officer Burningham and a second 
officer went to the apartment to question defendant. R. 395: 37. After defendant's 
girlfriend admitted the officers inside, Officer Burningham asked to speak with 
defendant in the outside hallway. R. 395: 37. Initially, defendant was calm, but 
"[v]ery rapidly and increasingly, his demeanor became. . . very, very agi ta ted. . . . " 
R. 395:37-38. Fearing a confrontation, Officer Burningham handcuffed defendant. 
R. 395: 38. After briefly speaking with defendant's girlfriend, Officer Burningham 
2
 Less than three months later, Dorrell pled guilty to the aggravated robbery. 
R. 395:93,102-03. Two months after his plea, Dorrell changed his story to implicate 
a "Jeffrey Chris/7 rather than defendant, as his accomplice. R. 395: 103. At 
defendant's trial, Dorrell claimed that he falsely implicated defendant because the 
two were having troubles as friends and he believed he would receive a more 
favorable sentence. R. 395:100-01. 
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took defendant to the police station for questioning. R. 395: 38. There, defendant 
waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with Officer Burningham. R. 395:40. 
He denied any involvement in the robbery, but admitted to knowing Dorrell and 
being with Dorrell for a time on the night of the robbery. R. 395:41,49. Defendant 
was not arrested for the robbery at the time, but was taken to jail on a "small 
warrant." R. 395: 41-42. 
A few days later, Officer Burningham compiled a "six-pack photo spread" 
that included a photograph of defendant. R. 395: 43-44. He and Detective Ken 
Schoney then went to the Breathe Day Spa to present the photo spread to spa 
employees Martucci and Jackson. R. 395:45,50. He presented the photo spread first 
to Martucci, and then to Jackson, each outside the presence of the other. R. 395:46. 
Before asking Martucci to review the photo spread, Officer Burningham told her 
that the suspect may or may not be present. R. 395: 46, 73, 85-86, 91. Martucci 
reviewed the photo spread and identified defendant (top right, number 3) as 
White—the robber who demanded the money. R. 395:73-74,86. As instructed, she 
drew a box around defendant's photo and signed her name next to that photo. R. 
395:47,73-74; SE1. She also rated her confidence level as a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. R. 
395: 47, 74, 86; SE1. Martucci later testified at trial that her confidence level 
increased when she saw defendant in person at two pretrial hearings, and that she 
was "very certain" when she saw defendant at trial. R. 395: 74-76, 87-88. Jackson 
7 
was unable to make an identification when presented with the photo spread, 
explaining that she never got a good look at White's face. See R. 396:127. 
Detective Schoney also presented a photo spread that included defendant's 
photograph to Alicia Warnock. R. 395: 105-06. She was unable to identify 
defendant or anyone else as one of the robbers. R. 395: 31,106. At trial, however, 
Warnock identified defendant as White—the man who demanded the money from 
the cash register. R. 395: 23. When defense counsel presented Martucci with an 
enlarged photograph of Jeffrey Chris—the man defendant later implicated in the 
robbery—she testified he was not the person who robbed her at the spa. R. 395:108. 
C. Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony on 
Eyewitness Identification. 
Dr. David Dodd received his Ph.D. in psychology at the University of 
Colorado and is an associate professor of psychology at the University of Utah. R. 
393:5-6. He has reviewed the literature on eyewitness perception and memory and 
has conducted some of his own research on the topic. R. 393:5-6. He has testified as 
an expert witness on eyewitness identification in federal and state courts in Utah 
and state courts in Colorado. R. 393: 6. In preparation for his testimony at the 
hearing, Dr. Dodd reviewed the police reports, the photo spread used by police, and 
the testimony from the preliminary hearing. R. 393: 7. 
Dr. Dodd explained that the memory process is divided into three phases: 
acquisition, retention, and retrieval. R. 393:10. 
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Acquisition. Dodd identified four concerns during the acquisition phase of 
the witnesses in this case: (1) the partial covering of the face (a form of disguise) 
"disrupts to some degree the accuracy" of an identification, and in this case, White 
held his arm over his face, R. 393: 10,12-13; (2) White's face was "only seen very 
briefly" when he took the money from Martucci, R. 393: 10, and in addition, 
witnesses tend to exaggerate the time period they actually observed the perpetrator, 
especially when their identification is confirmed by the officer, R. 393: 19-20; (3) a 
witness's ability to acquire information is "disrupted" when they are "highly 
stressed"; and (4) witnesses "do more poorly when a weapon is present" because 
they "spend a lot of their time looking at the weapon rather than . . . at the face" of 
the perpetrator (distraction), R. 393:12,21-22. 
Retention. Dodd testified that during the retention stage, memory may 
change due to the passage of time, as when a witness forgets details. R. 393:13. He 
testified that memory may also be altered during the retention stage through 
"suggestion." R. 393: 13. He identified five protocols that minimize this risk: 
(1) witnesses should be told that the suspect may or may not be in the photo spread 
(witnesses are otherwise likely to make an identification regardless), R. 393:13-15; 
(2) the foils in a photospread should match the description given by the witness, not 
the suspect, R. 393:15; (3) officers should employ "double-blind" testing, where the 
officer administering the photo spread does not know which of the photos is the 
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suspect's (in this way, the officer will not inadvertently cue the witness to the 
suspect), R. 393: 16-17; (4) photos should be presented sequentially rather than 
simultaneously (witnesses are otherwise inclined to make a "comparative 
judgment" and simply choose the person who looks most like the perpetrator), R. 
393:17-18; and (5) officers should not confirm an identification (otherwise witness 
confidence in the accuracy of an identification is inflated), R. 393:18-19. 
Retrieval Dodd testified that the accuracy of an identification may also be 
influenced by the confirmation of prior identifications. R. 393: 20. Thus, where a 
witness identifies a suspect as the perpetrator in a photo spread, as in this case, her 
confidence in subsequent identifications is likely to increase. R. 393: 20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,492 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that trial courts must give an appropriate jury instruction on the factors affecting the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications whenever eyewitness identification is a 
central issue in the case and the instruction is requested by the defense. Defendant 
seeks to expand Long to also require the admission of expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in the 
case and the proffered expert testimony will focus on the factors specific to the case 
that could influence the accuracy of the witness's identification. Such a rule was 
espoused in Chief Justice Durham lead opinion in State v. Maestas, 2002 UT123, %% 
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19-23, 63 P.3d 621, but firmly rejected by the remainder of justices. The majority 
preserved the trial court's traditional discretion in either admitting such expert 
testimony or giving a Long instruction. Maestas compels affirmance in this case. 
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the trial court did not misinterpret 
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,48 P.3d 953, as creating a per se rule of inadmissibility. 
The court recognized that it could either admit the expert testimony or give a Long 
instruction. After analyzing the Dr. David Dodd's proposed testimony, the court 
simply concluded that a Long instruction was sufficient in this case. 
Defendant claims that Dr. Dodd's testimony was necessary to advise the jury 
regarding concerns in this case that the witness's identification may have been 
influenced by suggestion, by an artificial increase in confidence with each 
subsequent identification, and by stress and weapon focus. These factors, however, 
were adequately addressed in the instruction submitted by defendant and given by 
the court. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
expert testimony. 
Defendant also claims that Dr. Dodd's testimony should have been admitted 
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. Because defendant fails to brief this issue, 
this Court should not address it. In any event, the trial court's decision to exclude 
the testimony was well within its discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND RULING 
THAT JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
COULD SUFFICIENTLY EDUCATE THE JURY 
Defendant filed a notice that he would call Dr. David Dodd to testify as an 
expert about "the psychological research on eyewitness identification" and "how 
the research applies to the specific factors of [Octavia] Martucci's identification of 
[defendant] from the photo spread." R. 42, 56-72, 87-142. The State moved to 
exclude the proposed expert testimony, arguing that it would constitute a lecture to 
the jury, the substance of which could be adequately conveyed in a jury instruction, 
that it "would invade the province of the jury to assess credibility," and that it 
would otherwise "cause confusion of the issues and waste time during trial." R. 73-
84. 
Relying on State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,48 P.3d 953, the trial court granted 
the State's motion and excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony. R. 289. After "considering] 
the arguments presented by counsel and the testimony of Dr. Dodd offered on May 
10, 2006," the trial court "f[ound] that Dr. Dodd's testimony would constitute a 
lecture to the jury," concluded that the jury could be educated "through the use of 
appropriate instructions," and "invite[d] counsel to submit instructions t h a t . . . are 
appropriate in light of the evidence presented [by Dr. Dodd] regarding eyewitness 
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identification." R. 289. Thereafter, defendant submitted a proposed instruction on 
the factors affecting the reliability of an eyewitness identification and, without 
objection, the court gave the instruction to the jury as proposed by defendant See R. 
314, 316-20,343-47; R. 396:113-14,130-31. 
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling as an abuse of 
discretion. Aplt. Brf. at 14. This claim lacks merit. 
A. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to admit 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification or to give cautionary 
instructions on eyewitness identification. 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that "human memory is both limited and fallible" and that "failures may 
occur and inaccuracies creep in at any stage of . . . the 'memory process.'" Long 
observed that "jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems" and may 
thus give undue weight to eyewitness testimony. Id. at 490, 492. To remedy this 
concern, Long held that "trial courts shall g i v e . . . an instruction [on the factors that 
affect the accuracy of an identification] whenever eyewitness identification is a 
central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense." Id. at 
492. 
Long concluded that the instruction set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 469 
F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), though imperfect, was "under most circumstances" 
sufficient to educate the jury on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
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identifications. Long, 721 P.2d at 494. The Court did not, however, prescribe the use 
of the Telfaire instruction or any other instruction. Id. at 492-94. Instead, it granted 
trial counsel and judges "some latitude" in formulating appropriate instructions 
tailored to the specific case, so long as those instructions "sensitize the jury to the 
factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those that laypersons most likely 
would not appreciate." Id. at 493. 
The Utah Supreme Court "'has not extended [Long's] cautionary instruction 
requirement to include additional expert testimony concerning eyewitness 
identification/" State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, \ 42,27 P.3d 1133 (quoting State v. 
Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)). 
Indeed, the Court has not adopted, "either explicitly or implicitly, a per se rule of 
admissibility or inadmissibility " State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1139, 63 P.3d 
621 (Russon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 
45, % 14. Instead, the decision of whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification lies "within the sound discretion of the trial court." Butterfield, 2001 
UT 59,%43; accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,114; Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 66 (holding that 
"'trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony7" on eyewitness identification). 
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Eyewitness experts are generally asked to give two different kinds of 
testimony: (1) testimony that educates the jury on the factors known to affect the 
reliability of an identification, and (2) testimony that assesses the reliability of a 
particular identification based on those factors. 
In the first scenario, the expert is asked to explain for the jury "the scientific 
bases and research underlying the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification/7 Id. Because such testimony "would apply to any crime or any trial" 
and does not require a "knowledge of the facts of the case," it is not "in the true 
sense" expert testimony, but merely "a lecture to the jury as to how they should 
judge the evidence." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,143. 
In the second scenario, the expert is asked to "analyze [the] circumstances 
present when an eyewitness observed a defendant and suggest how accurate [the] 
eyewitness' identification is." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, \ 17. Hubbard noted that 
"[s]uch expert testimony, regardless of whether it is presented hypothetically or by 
applying the circumstances of a particular case, will result in dueling experts 
evaluating for the jury how much weight to give to the testimony of percipient 
witnesses." Id. This kind of testimony is especially problematic because "in our 
judicial system it is the role of the jury to decide how much weight to give the 
testimony of particular witnesses, not the role of independent experts." Id. at % 15. 
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The trial court is thus faced with a dilemma whenever a request is made to 
admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Id. If the court "[p]ermit[s] an 
expert witness, either directly or indirectly, to analyze the credibility of a percipient 
witness for the jury," the expert, to a lesser or greater extent, "steps into the 
province of the jury." Id. On the other hand, if the court excludes expert testimony 
"about the limitations inherent in eyewitness identifications, the jury might not be 
educated about the potential deficiencies of eyewitness identification." Id. Long's 
requirement that trial courts instruct juries on these potential deficiencies and the 
factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications generally resolves this 
dilemma. Cf. id. (noting that if expert testimony is excluded, it "fall[s] upon the 
court to instruct the jury on the limitations and problems that research has 
discovered"). For this reason, trial courts have broad discretion to either admit the 
expert testimony or give an appropriate Long instruction. See id. at %% 17, 20. 
Hubbard explained that the decision to admit expert testimony "is a matter 
best left to the trial court's discretion because of the trial court's superior position to 
judge the advisability of allowing such testimony." Id. at f 1 4 . Hubbard expressed 
its confidence that "[i]f the trial court determines that the better result would be to 
educate the jury through a Long instruction, counsel [will] certainly [be] able to 
present proposed Long instructions that explain the potential effects of certain 
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circumstances on the powers of observation and recollection and present their 
positions on how the Long cautionary instruction should be given/' Id. at f 1 8 . 
Accordingly, an appellate court will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony absent an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion, i.e., "'unless 
the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 35 , f66 (quoting 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). The discretion exercised by the trial 
court "'necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate 
court can properly find abuse only if... no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court."' See Hubbard, 2001 UT 59, \ 28 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) (brackets in original). Stated another way, "the 
appellate court must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of 
reasonable disagreement." Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540,542 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2000). 
B. The trial court's decision to permit Long instructions that included 
the proffered evidence from Dr. Dodd, in lieu of his testimony at 
trial, was well within the limits of reasonability. 
Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
expert testimony regarding the problems with eyewitness identification specific to 
this case and determining that a jury instruction could adequately educate the jury 
on the problems with eyewitness identification." Aplt. Brf. at 14. This argument 
lacks merit and the Court should therefore affirm defendant's conviction. 
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1. State v. Maestas rejects the per se rule of admissibility espoused 
by defendant and compels affirmance of the trial court's ruling 
here. 
Citing Chief Justice Durham's opinion in State v. Maestas, 2002 UT123,63 P.3d 
621, defendant asks this Court to adopt a rule requiring trial courts to admit expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification whenever "eyewitness identification is a 
central issue and the expert's testimony will focus on the specific facts of the case in 
relation to the scientific evidence regarding the reliability of the eyewitness 
identification." Aplt. Brf. at 18. He argues that given Long's expressed concern that 
jurors are largely unaware of the inherent deficiencies in eyewitness identifications, 
expert testimony is "essential to a defendant's ability to present a defense since 
without such testimony, a jury's misconceptions rather than relevant evidence could 
determine the outcome." Aplt. Brf. at 16-18, 21-22, 24. Because the majority in 
Maestas rejected such a rule, defendant's argument must fail. 
Like defendant here, see R. 56-72, Maestas moved the trial court to allow Dr. 
David Dodd to testify generally "about the factors that affect the reliability of 
identifications" and to testify more particularly "about the factors specific to the 
Maestas case that could influence the accuracy of an eyewitness." Maestas, 2002 UT 
123, Tl 13,22. As he did here, see R. 393: 7, "Dr. Dodd [in Maestas] would review 
police reports, eyewitness transcripts from preliminary hearings, photo sp reads . . . , 
and then review the research most relevant to the case." Id. But, as in this case, see 
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R. 289, the trial court denied the motion, "ruling that a jury instruction could 
sufficiently inform the jury of 'concerns about and factors affecting accuracy of 
eyewitness identification/" Id. at % 13 (quoting trial court). 
Chief Justice Durham authored the lead opinion in Maestas, but no other 
justice joined. The Chief Justice would have reversed on this issue, agreeing with 
Maestas's assertion "that he [could not] receive a fair trial without presenting expert 
testimony on the credibility of eyewitness identification." Id. at \ 19. In so 
concluding, Chief Justice Durham espoused, in effect, a per se rule of admissibility 
of expert testimony on eyewitness identification whenever the prosecution's case 
"rests on eyewitness testimony" and the proposed expert testimony is "targeted to 
the specific evidence in the case." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ \ 22-23. 
The remainder of the Court rejected the Chief Justice's approach. Associate 
Chief Justice Durrant, joined by Justice Wilkins, rejected "the creation of [such] a per 
se rule" and reaffirmed the trial court's "wide discretion" to exclude expert 
testimony. Id. at W 68, 72 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Justice Russon, joined by Justice Howe, likewise rejected Chief Justice Durham's 
"per se rule of admissibility." Id. at \ 139 (Russon, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). Thus, a four-justice majority affirmed the trial court's ruling 
that a jury instruction, in lieu of expert testimony, was sufficient to educate the jury 
on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identifications, firmly holding that the 
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admissibility of expert testimony "'is a matter best left to the trial court's 
discretion.'" See id. at ff 68,136 (quoting Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, J 14). 
The Maestas majority upheld the trial court's decision to rely on Long 
instructions, in lieu of expert testimony, even though Dr. Dodd was prepared to 
testify, as he was here, about the factors specific to the case that could influence the 
accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. See id. at \ 66. Where the circumstances 
in Maestas are nearly identical to those in this case, this Court must affirm the trial 
court's exercise of discretion in offering Long instructions in lieu of Dr. Dodd's 
testimony. 
2. The trial court properly applied the analysis set forth in State v. 
Hubbard. 
Defendant contends that "[r]ather than ascertaining whether the specifics of 
this case required expert testimony as outlined in Hubbard, the trial court misapplied 
Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the eyewitness identification 
testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 25; see also Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. He accuses the trial court of 
"fail[ing] to do any independent analysis of the specific facts of this case in making 
its determination regarding how jury instructions are sufficient to adequately 
educate the jury on the expert's knowledge which is counterintuitive to the average 
juror." Aplt. Brf. at 20. This claim lacks merit. 
In granting the State's motion to exclude the expert testimony, the trial court 
correctly observed that the admission of expert testimony "'is within the sound 
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discretion of the trial court/" R. 289 (quoting State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f 43,27 
P.3d 1133). The court reviewed the parties7 arguments and the testimony of Dr. 
Dodd from the May 10, 2006 hearing. R. 289. After doing so, it observed "that it 
would not be an abuse of discretion to admit Dr. Dodd's testimony." R. 289 
(emphasis added). The court ruled, however, that under Hubbard, it was "entirely 
appropriate . . . to instruct the jury instead of allowing expert testimony" because 
Dr. Dodd's testimony "would 'constitute a lecture, the substance of which can be 
just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction/" R. 
289 (quoting Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, i f 17-18). 
The trial court thus recognized that Hubbard required it neither to admit the 
expert testimony or to exclude the expert testimony. Contrary to defendant's claim, 
it carefully reviewed Dr. Dodd's proposed testimony in deciding whether to admit 
it. Therefore, the court did not interpret Hubbard as establishing a per se rule of 
inadmissibility, as defendant suggests. It simply concluded that the information 
that would otherwise be explained by Dr. Dodd could be adequately conveyed in an 
instruction. As explained, this ruling was well within the court's discretion. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
eyewitness testimony because the modified Long instruction 
adequately alerted the jury to factors affecting the reliability of 
the eyewitness identifications specific to this case. 
Defendant argues that Dr. Dodd's testimony "was necessary 'to inform the 
jury not only about the psychological research on eyewitness identification, but 
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. . . how the research applies to the specific factors of [Octavia] Martucci's 
identification of [defendant].'" Aplt. Brf. at 12 (citation omitted). To the extent 
defendant suggests that Dr. Dodd should have been able to opine on the reliability 
of Martucci's identification in light of these factors, defendant's claim fails because 
to do so would invade the province of the jury "to decide how much weight to give 
the testimony of particular witnesses." See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, % 15. 
Defendant also contends that jury instructions were insufficient because they 
"could not adequately communicate to the jury all the concerns regarding the 
fallibility of the eyewitness identification specific to this case." Aplt. Brf. at 15, 22. 
Specifically, defendant contends that Dr. Dodd's testimony was necessary to discuss 
(1) "studies showing that faulty original identifications based on suggestion either 
intended or otherwise result in all subsequent identification being suspect," Aplt. 
Brf. at 23; (2) "studies showing how a witness over time through repeated exposure 
to the defendant within the criminal process becomes more confident that she has 
chosen correctly and how that identification is not necessarily accurate," Aplt. Brf. at 
23; and (3) studies showing the impairing effect on memory caused by "'weapon 
focus/ stress, and fear," Aplt. Brf. at 24. This claim lacks merit. 
Defendant has not explained why this information could not have been 
adequately conveyed to a jury through a cautionary instruction. These principles 
are not so complex that the jury could not have been informed of them through an 
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appropriately worded instruction. Indeed, the instruction on eyewitness 
identification submitted to the jury in this case (Instruction No. 14) addressed each 
of these three areas. 
First, with respect to the effect of suggestion (intended or unintended clues by 
police) on the reliability of original identifications, Instruction No. 14 instructed the 
jury that in determining whether the identification was "completely the product of 
the witness' [sic] own memory/ ' it should consider "the exposure of the witness to 
opinions, to photographs, or to any other information or influence that may have 
affected the independence of the identification of the defendant by the witness." R. 
345. The instruction also instructed the jury to consider: 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the 
witness for identification. For example, you may consider that 
when an officer who is aware of the identity of a suspect presents a 
photo spread to a witness, he may inadvertently cue the witness as 
to which of the photos is the suspect. Similarly, a witness who is 
presented with six photographs simultaneously may be more likely 
to select one of the photos than a witness who is presented with the 
photographs sequentially regardless of whether the photo of the 
perpetrator is included. 
R. 345-46. Second, with respect to the tendency that witness confidence in an 
identification artificially increases with each subsequent identification, Instruction 
No. 14 advised the jury that "a witness who has previously made an identification is 
likely to become more confident in making subsequent identifications and is likely 
to exaggerate the factors favorable to the witness's opportunity to observe the 
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actor/' R. 344. And third, with respect to the impairing effect on memory caused by 
weapon focus, stress, and fear, Instruction No. 14 advised the jury that "the capacity 
of the witness is likely to be impaired [by] . . . stress or fright at the time of 
observation." R. 344. The instruction further advised that in determining whether 
the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to observe the perpetrator, the jury 
should consider "the presence or absence of distracting . . . activity during the 
observation." R. 344. This latter instruction was broad enough to include "weapon 
focus," which Dr. Dodd characterized as a form of distraction. See R. 393:12,21-22. 
These instructions adequately educated the jury on the three areas 
complained of in defendant's brief, and as in Maestas, "g[a]ve [defendant] the 
opportunity to . . . argue how each of those factors could have affected particular 
eyewitnesses." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, % 74: (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (quotations and citation omitted). Defense counsel took this 
opportunity and argued each of these points, to a lesser or greater extent, in his 
closing argument. See R. 396: 141-45. Having received the modified Long 
instruction and listened to defense counsel's argument as to how those factors 
affected the reliability of the eyewitnesses, the jury needed no more assistance in 
making a determination about the overall reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications. The proposed expert testimony, therefore, would have added little, 
if anything, to the information provided in the modified Long instruction. 
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To the extent that the instructions did not fully cover the relevant factors 
identified by Dr. Dodd, defendant has invited any error. The trial court "invite [d] 
counsel to submit instructions that . . . are appropriate in light of the evidence 
presented [by Dr. Dodd] regarding eyewitness identification/' R. 289. Defendant 
submitted the modified Long instruction and the trial court gave the instruction as 
submitted. See R. 314, 316-20, 343-47; R. 396: 113-14, 130-31. He cannot now 
complain that the instructions were inadequate. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <j[ 
54, 70 P.3d 111 (refusing to address a challenge to a jury instruction approved by 
defendant). 
In sum, [the] trial court's determination that expert testimony would amount 
to a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence, and its subsequent 
refusal to admit such testimony into evidence '[was] not an abuse of discretion, 
particularly where there has been no showing that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict/" 
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Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, J 43 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,61 (Utah 1982)); 
accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, <][ 20.3 
4. This Court should not address defendant's rule 702 claim because 
it was not adequately briefed. 
Defendant notes that under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, "the test of the 
admissibility of an expert's testimony is whether it assists the trier of fact, or in other 
words, whether it is helpful/' Aplt. Brf. at 15. He argues that "'expert opinion is 
proper when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical 
knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror .... '" 
Aplt. Brf. at 16 (citation omitted). Defendant suggests that because the deficiencies 
of eyewitness identification are not within the knowledge of the average juror, he 
was entitled to call Dr. Dodd to testify under rule 702. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. 
Defendant's rule 702 claim fails at the outset because it is not adequately briefed on 
appeal. 
3
 Defendant also complains that the jury instruction was inadequate because 
the jury did not receive it until "after all the evidence was in." Aplt. Brf. at 15. He 
argues that an expert is better able to educate the jury "when the jury [is] hearing 
the evidence and determining witness credibility." Aplt. Brf. at 15. Defendant thus 
suggests that the jury needed to first hear the expert testimony in order to properly 
evaluate the eyewitness identifications. But as defendant's witness, Dr. Dodd 
would not have testified until after the State called the eyewitnesses in its case in 
chief. Thus, defendant would not have enjoyed any timing advantage had the 
expert been allowed to testify. In either case, the jury would not be apprised of the 
Long factors until after the witnesses had testified. 
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Under rule 702, an expert "may testify" at trial if his or her "scientific, 
technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. Utah courts have held 
that in making this "helpfulness" determination, "the trial court must first decide 
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average 
individual." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. This inquiry, however, is only the first step in 
determining whether expert testimony is helpful under rule 702. 
If the trial court concludes that the evidence is beyond the ken of the average 
person, it must then determine whether the expert testimony "will be more 
probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f 30; accord Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12 (holding that court 
must "balanc[e]. . . the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair 
prejudice" as required under rule 403). This second step is "an integral element of a 
rule 702 determination" and cannot be ignored. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12. 4 
4
 When expert testimony is based on novel scientific principles, Utah courts 
impose a three-part standard of admissibility. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,396-
98 & nn.7-8 (Utah 1989). The trial court must determine (1) "whether the scientific 
principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable," 
(2) whether "the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly 
applied to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts," and (3) 
"whether the proffered scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial as 
required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 
641 (Utah 1996); accord Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 397-98 & nn.7-8. 
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In making the rule 403 determination, Utah courts have held that "the relative 
probative value of the proffered scientific evidence of a fact in issue becomes 
important/7 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. "For example, if the scientific proof is 
based on undeniably valid scientific premises, has a high degree of power to 
accurately determine the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue, and is easily 
replicable and its application to similar situations has been tested and validated 
often, then the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the 
jury, etc., attendant to its introduction would have to be great indeed to preclude its 
admission." Id. On the other hand, "if there were weaknesses in the testimony on 
some or all of these points, then it would be relatively easier to show that the 
dangers of admission outweighed the probativeness of the testimony." Id. 
Other important variables in making the rule 403 determination include "the 
nature of the evidence offered, the quality of the other evidence available to the 
finder of fact, and the centrality of the issue to which the scientific evidence is 
directed." Id. For example, a stronger probativeness showing should be required 
"'when the inferences from the scientific evidence sweep broadly or cut deeply into 
sensitive areas/" that is, into areas that are "central to the core of the fact-finding 
process—whether one witness or another is telling the truth." Id. (citation omitted). 
On appeal, defendant addresses only the first step of the helpfulness 
determination, arguing that he was entitled to introduce the expert testimony 
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because jurors are largely unaware of the factors affecting the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications. See R. 394: 44-47; Aplt. Brf. at 15-16. He has wholly 
failed to address, much less analyze, the proposed testimony under rule 403. 
Accordingly, the Court should decline to address defendant's rule 702 claim. See 
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ \ 13,15, 72 P.3d 138 (declining to address claims 
that were not supported by legal analysis). 
In any event, the trial court has "wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony" under rule 702, Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361, and an 
abuse of that discretion will be found "'only if . . . no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, \ 28 (quoting 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887) (brackets in original). Where the Supreme Court has 
consistently held, in Butterfield, Hollen, Hubbard, and Maestas, that trial courts have 
the discretion to give Long instructions in lieu of admitting expert testimony, it 
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so here. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not fully explained the relationship between 
rule 702 and its decisions in Butterfield, Hollen, Hubbard, and Maestas. An 
examination of those decisions, however, suggests that the Court's refusal to require 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification stems from the potential that such 
testimony maybe unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. See Utah R. Evid. 403 (stating 
that relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially 
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"). In those cases, the Court implicitly 
recognizes that expert testimony on eyewitness identification carries the risk that a 
jury will simply accept the expert's judgments and thereby abdicate its role as fact 
finder on the critical issue of witness credibility. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 74 
(Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ f 15, 
20; Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 70; Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, % 43. The Long instruction 
resolves this concern while ensuring that the jury is adequately informed of the 
factors affecting the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. See supra, at 16. 
Moreover, where a Long instruction is given, admission of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification may likewise be excluded under rule 403 because it 
could cause "confusion of the issues," "undue delay," a "waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403; see Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 
\ 44; Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 66 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
In sum, expert testimony would not be helpful under rule 702 where, as here, 
Long instructions adequately educate the jury on the factors affecting the reliability 
of an eyewitness identification and defendant can argue how those factors may have 
affected the eyewitness identifications. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ \ 74 (Durrant, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part). The trial court below concluded that it 
could "educate the jury through the use of appropriate instructions instead of 
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through expert testimony/7 R. 289. Given the risk that a jury would defer to the 
expert rather than make its own reliability determination, the trial court's ruling was 
reasonable under rule 702. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 74 (Durrant, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted June 6,2007. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
-j££ffey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR-' 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
e
^^yoh^r 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANDREW BRINK, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 061900386 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Date: May 31, 2006 
This matter is before the Court on the State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony 
Regarding Eyewitness Identification. Having considered the arguments presented by counsel and the 
testimony of Dr. Dodd offered on May 10, 2006, the Court GRANTS the State's Motion. 
"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification should be 
allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,143, 27 P.3d 
1133 (citations omitted). While the Court finds that it would not be an abuse of discretion to admit Dr. 
Dodd's testimony, the Court finds State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953 particularly persuasive on 
this issue. In Hubbard, the court found that when an expert's testimony would "constitute a lecture, the 
substance of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction, 
as opposed to through expert testimony," it is entirely appropriate for the trial judge to choose to instruct 
the jury instead of allowing expert testimony. Id. at fflf 17-18. In the present case, the Court finds that Dr. 
Dodd's testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury and, therefore, the Court chooses to educate the jury 
through the use of appropriate instructions instead of through expert testimony. 
The Court, however, is persuaded by Dr. Dodd's testimony and the supplemental materials provided 
by Defense counsel, that Long instructions may not adequately address all of the problems inherent with 
eyewitness testimony and particularly with photographic lineups. In following Hubbard fs admonition that 
courts "specifically tailor instructions other than those offered in Long [to] address the deficiencies inherent 
in eyewitness identification" (id. at ^  20), the Court invites counsel to submit instructions that they believe 
are appropriate in light of the evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /V 
An important question in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the person who committed 
the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was 
committed, but also that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime. If, after considering the evidence 
you have heard from both sides, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person 
who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was 
an expression of belief or impression by the witness. To 
find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that 
the identification witness was not insincere, but merely 
that the witness was mistaken in his or her belief or 
impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. 
In considering whether the prosecution has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? In answering this question, 
you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the 
actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the 
actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and 
time of observation; 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting 
noises or activity during the observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the 
opportunity of the witness to observe the 
person committing the crime. 
You should also be aware that a witness who has 
previously made an identification is likely to become more 
confident in making subsequent identifications and is 
likely to exaggerate the factors favorable to the witness's 
opportunity to observe the actor. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the 
person committing the crime? In answering this question, 
you should consider that the capacity of the witness is 
likely to be impaired if any of the following factors are 
present: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) Fatigue or injury. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race that 
the criminal actor. Identification by a person of a 
different race may be less reliable than identification by 
a person of the same race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the 
witness completely the product of the witness' own memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the 
original observation of the witness and the 
identification of the defendant by the 
witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the 
witness at the time of the identification; 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to 
photographs, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the 
independence of the identification of the 
defendant by the witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to 
identify the defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a 
description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's 
appearance; 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant 
was presented to the witness for 
identification. For example, you may 
consider that when an officer who is aware 
of the identity of a suspect presents a 
photo spread to a witness, he may 
inadvertently cue the witness as to which of 
the photos is the suspect. Similarly, a 
witness who is presented with six 
photographs simultaneously may be more 
likely to select one of the photos than a 
witness who is presented with the 
photographs sequentially regardless of 
whether the photo of the perpetrator is 
included. 
You may take into account that an identification made 
by picking the defendant from a group of similar 
individuals is generally more reliable than an 
identification made from the defendant being presented 
alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications 
made from seeing the person are generally more reliable 
that identifications made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from 
the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating 
the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations 
listed above, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is the person who committed the crime 
charged, and you find all of the other elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime charged, you must find the defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged. 
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